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held invalid. Helson v. Kentutky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929) (tax upon amount of gasoline
purchased outside state and consumed by interstate ferry within state); Binghain v.
Golden Eagle Western Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936) (tax upon gasoline consumed in state
by interstate busses). The Utah case has been criticized on the ground that the electricity taxed did not come into existence until its interstate flow had actually begun.
42 Yale L. J. 96 (1932). As a practical matter, however, so long as generators at the
power plant are operating, the plant is in effect manufacturing (converting) energy
preparatory to its interstate transfer. Since the tax in the principal case was levied according to the plant's capacity to generate energy, it must be interpreted as a tax on
the manufacture rather than on the use of this energy. The court therefore erroneously
distinguished the Utah case; but its decision may be regarded as a desirable inroad
upon the tenuous division of an instantaneous activity into "manufacture" and "transportation."
Contracts-Quasi-contractual Relief for One Not Substantially Performing a
Building Contract-[Wisconsin].-The plaintiff contracted to build a first-class roof
upon the defendant's building for $325. Upon completion, the defendant refused to
pay, contending that it was not properly constructed and that it leaked soon after it
was put on. A jury found that the cost of repairing the roof to make it conform to the
contract would be $75 and that the defendant had suffered $75 damage because of
leakage. The trial court accordingly awarded the plaintiff $175. On appeal, held, reversed. The plaintiff could not recover on the contract because he had not substantially performed. Since there was no acceptance of the roof by the defendant, the
plaintiff could not recover even the reasonable value thereof. To recover on a theory
of unjust enrichment there must be such an acceptance as is something besides a
keeping and using where there is no opportunity to return what has been received.
Nees v. Weaver, 269 N.W. 266 (Wis. 1936).
This court's unqualified requirement of "acceptance" for the relief of one who has
insubstantially performed his contract is indicative of widespread judicial unwillingness to consider each such case on its particular merits. For a considerable period,
strict contract notions militated against the relief of one who bad deviated even the
slightest from his express obligation. 3 Williston, Contracts § 675 (2d ed. 1936). But
the manifest injustice to those who, in good faith, had omitted some slight detail in
performing their contracts led courts, especially in cases involving building contracts,
to protect a contractor who had substantially performed. Jacob & Youngs Inc. v.
Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921); 3 Williston, Contracts § 805 (2d ed. 1936).
Where a contractor has performed a large but not a "substantial" part of his contract,
further protection has been necessary to avoid uncompensated enrichment to the
other contracting party. Gale v. Dixon, 91 Cal. App. 529, 267 Pac. 342 (1928). Thus
many courts granted recovery on a quantum reruitcount if an acceptance of the benefits resulting from the plaintiff's performance could be shown. Manitowoc Steam
Boiler Works v. Manitowoc Glue Co., 120 Wis. 1, 97 N.W. 515 (19o3); Robinson Cwnst.
Co. v. Barry, 135 Md. 275, lo8 Atl. 688 (i919); Everroadv. Schwartzkopf, 123 Ind. 35,
23 N.E. 969 (18go). The measure of damages in these cases, although termed the
reasonable value of materials and services furnished, was ascertained by deducting
from the contract price the damages to the defendant resulting from the breach.
White Star Coal Co. v. Pursifidl, 189 Ky. 296, 217 S.W. 1020 (1920); Ginsbergv. Myers,
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215 Mich. 148, 183 N.W. 749 (1921). See Rest., Contracts § 357 (1) (b), (3). The requirement of an "acceptance," while easily satisfied when the defendant has received
chattels, has been practically prohibitive of relief in land cases: strong notions of
landowner protection have led the courts to consider the mere taking of possession as
insufficient evidence of an "acceptance" of the work done. Manitowoc Boiler Works
v. Manitowoc Glue Co., 120 Wis. i, 97 N.W. 515 (I9O3); Falk v. Nitz, 219 Mich. 650,
189 N.W. 921 (1922). Since so much acquiescence by the defendant is necessary
to find an "acceptance" in building cases, this relief should more appropriately be
termed recovery on an implied-in-fact contract. Munro v. Butt, 8 El. & Bl. 738 (1858).
And in most jurisdictions this is the full extent of relief today.
Clearly such protection is still inadequate for those contractors who in good faith
thought they had fully completed their contract but, because of their ignorance or incompetence, had not rendered substantial performance. The task of ascertaining the
actual benefit received by the defendant and of balancing with it the plaintiff's state
of mind in carrying on his work seems to present an obvious situation for equitable
relief unhampered by broad reactions to breaches of contract. Thus, a few courts
have given true quasi-contractual relief if there was a breach in good faith. Peterson v.
Sutter, 4 La. App. 18o (1926); Jackson Lumber & Supply Co. v. Deaton, 209 Ky. 239,
272 S.W. 717 (1925); see Rest., Contracts § 357 (i) (a). Other courts, following the
analogy of Britton v. Turner (6 N.H. 481 (1834)), have protected a contractor who wilfully abandoned his contract. Davis v. Barrington, 30 N.H. 517 (1855); Aetna Iron &
Steel v. Kossuth Cty., 79 Iowa 40, 44 N.W. 215 (18go). This latter rule has frequently
been criticized as making a breach of contract profitable, resulting in a greater disregard of the binding effect of contractual obligations. 6 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 211 (1928).
The good faith rule is not subject to this objection, however, and presents a more compelling case for quasi-contractual relief, since a benefit has been conferred on the defendant with his consent and in good faith. Woodward, Quasi-Contracts §§ 7, 8
(1913); i Williston, Contracts § 3 (2d ed. 1936). It is evident that courts which require an "acceptance" before giving quasi-contractual relief are not speaking in terms
of an "equitable" remedy. See 24 Col. L. Rev. 885 (1924). If in the pursuance of the
latter type of relief the courts would substitute for talk of acceptance or waiver inquiries as to the causes of the plaintiff's breach and as to the amount of benefit to the
defendant, breaches of contracts would not be encouraged nor would the other party
be unjustly enriched.
In the instant case, the court made no attempt to inquire into the presence or absence of the plaintiff's good faith in failing to fix the roof to comply with the contract
after he had been notified of its defective condition. If there was an unconscionable
refusal to repair, no relief was merited. But if he bonafide thought that the roof was
properly constructed and defects were not certain until found by a jury, the court's
failure to find an "acceptance" in a building case can hardly be said to constitute a
fair disposal of the plaintiff's claim.

Corporate Reorganization-Limitation of Rent Claims under § 77B(b)-[Federal].
-Upon rejection of his lease in § 77B proceedings the debtor's lessor filed a claim for
the difference between the rent reserved and the present value of the term. The trial
court allowed the claim but limited its participation in the plan, even as against the
stockholders of the debtor, to an amount equal to three years' rent, approximately

